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On January 22, 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided
Roe v. Wade,' holding Texas's criminal abortion statutes unconstitu-
tional in their entirety. In May, 1973, Montana's criminal abortion
statutes were likewise struck down,2 leaving Montana with no criminal
sanctions against abortion. 3 This note will discuss the implications of
Roe v. Wade, the current abortion situation in Montana, and the possi-
bilities for legislative action.
ABORTION AND THE SUPREME COURT
Texas, like Montana and most other states, has for many years
prohibited abortion except to save the life of the pregnant woman. 4
Plaintiff Jane Roe, 5 unmarried and pregnant, was unable to obtain a
"legal" abortion in Texas, because her life was not endangered. Asking
for a declaratory judgment that the Texas abortion statutes were un-
constitutional on their face,6 she attacked the statutes on the grounds
that they were unconstitutionally vague, and that they violated her
right to personal privacy.7
A three-judge federal district court ruled that the "fundamental
right of single women and married persons to choose whether to have
children is protected by the Ninth Amendment, through the Fourteenth
Amendment,"" and that the Texas statutes were void because they were
'93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
Doe v. Woodahl, 360 F. Supp. 20 (D. Mont. 1973).
8REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 66-1041 (1947) (hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947)
provides penalties for practicing medicine without a license, however. For other rele-
vant existing statutes, see Section A, No Specific Abortion Legislation, infra.
'Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 709. TEXAS REVISED STATUTES, Arts. 1191-1194 and
1196, enacted in original form in 1854; R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-401 and 94-402, enacted
in original form in 1864. The Court footnotes twenty other state statutes similar to
Texas's, including R.C.M. 1947, § 94-401. The Court also points out that until after
the war between the states, common law governed abortion in most states, id. at 720,
and that abortion was not a common law crime before quickening (the point when the
mother feels the fetus move), and possibly even after. Id. at 717-18.
6"Jane Roe" is a pseudonym. Dr. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, was
granted status as plaintiff-intervenor, in his own right and for his married and single
patients. John and Mary Doe (pseudonyms for a married couple) filed a companion
complaint, alleging that though Mary Doe was not pregnant, a possible pregnancy
might endanger her health, according to her physician's judgment.
OShe also asked for an injunction against the defendant, Dallas County Attorney, to
prevent him from enforcing the statutes.
7Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1219, 1221 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
1Id. at 1225.
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unconstitutionally vague and an overbroad infringement of personal
privacy rights protected by the Ninth Amendment.9
On appeal, 10 the Supreme Court, in a seven to two decision with the
majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Blackmun," held the Texas
statutes in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 1 2 Addressing itself to the issue of personal privacy, the Court
said, "A right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or
zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution."'1 3 This right, or
the roots of it, have been found in the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, and in the "penumbras of the Bill of Rights.' 4 It includes
"only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,' "5 and it applies to some extent to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing
and education. 16 As to abortion, the Court held:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the
Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to term-
inate her pregnancy."
In finding the right of privacy broad enough to include the abortion
decision, however, the Court specifically rejected the contention that
a woman has an absolute right to "terminate her pregnancy at whatever
time, in whatever way, and for whatever reasons she alone chooses." 8
9Id.
"The district court's declaratory judgment applied to both Roe and Hallford, and
both appealed from refusal of their request for an injunction against defendant.
Because Dr. Halford was currently under indictment for performing abortions under
the challenged statutes, the Court denied him declaratory relief, remitting him to
his defenses in the pending criminal prosecution.
The Does appealed from the district court holding that they lacked standing to
sue and did not present a current controversy.
The defendant filed cross appeals from the grant of declaratory relief to Roe and
Hallford. Both sides took protective appeals to the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which were held in abeyance pending Supreme Court
decision.
"Justices White and Rehnquist dissenting.
"Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 732-33.
13Id. at 726. Though the right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitu-
tion, compare the 1972 Montana Constitution, Art. II, § 10, Right of Privacy. "The
right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.''
1Id.
25Id.
16id. at 726-27, citing: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1947) (procreation); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (contraception); Prince v. Massa,-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (child
rearing and education).
'1Id. at 727.
IsId. Some amici argued that "one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as
one pleases." To this the Court answered: [I]t is not clear to us that the claim .. .
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Though her right is "fundamental,' 19 and is therefore subject to state
regulation only where the state can show a "compelling interest, '20 the
state does have two interests which become increasingly "compelling"
as the pregnancy progresses. These are the state's interest in protecting
maternal health,21 and in preserving potential human life.
22
Neither of these interests is "compelling" through the entire preg-
nancy, however, and the Court set out guidelines to show at what point
each may influence or override the right to privacy. Given the statistical
safety of first trimester abortion, ' 3 as compared with childbirth,24 the
state's interest in preserving maternal health becomes "compelling" only
in the second trimester. Thus:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first tri-
mester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.'
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the
mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways
that are reasonably related to maternal health.'
The interest in preserving potential human life matures with the
development of the fetus, becoming "compelling" only when the fetus
is capable of independent life outside the uterus :27
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State, in promoting
its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses,
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary,
in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life
and health of the mother.'
In regard to the rights of the unborn, the Court first concluded
that "the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not
"Id. at 728.
20Id. "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regu-
lation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest'
[footnotes omitted], and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only the legitimate state interests at stake.''
0Mf. at 731.
2Id.
2A "trimester'' is approximately three months of pregnancy.
2id. at 724.
2Id. at 732. At this stage then, the state may regulate only through its general li-
censing provisions for physicians, and other provisions generally regulating the prac-
tice of medicine, including penalties for practicing medicine without a license.
2id. Applying this to pregnancy: "Examples of permissible state regulation
in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform
the abortion; as to the licensure of that persono as to the facility in which the abor-
tion is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or
some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and
the like." Note that these provisions do not apply to the first trimester of preg-
nancy. See discussion supra note 25.
"Viability" is the term for the point at which the fetus is capable of sustaining
independent life outside the uterus. "Viability is usually placed at about seven
months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Roe v. Wade, supra note
1 at 730.
2id. at 732. It should be noted that in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71-72
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include the unborn."' ' The Court then declined to "resolve the difficult
question of when life begins, '3 0 in light of the lack of consensus in medi-
cine, philosophy, and theology. Noting that the law has been hesitant
to accord legal rights to the unborn "except in narrowly defined situa-
tions and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth, '31 the
Court summarized, "In short, the unborn have never been recognized
in the law as persons in the whole sense. '3 2
The Court did not reach questions concerning the constitutionality
of statutes protecting rights of fathers, for instance by requiring written
consent for abortion by the husband of a married minor, because such
issues were not before the Court.33
Applicable to the entire pregnancy, the state may "define the term
'physician' . . . to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State,
and may proscribe abortion by a person who is not a physician so de-
fined. '34 Further, up to the point in pregnancy where compelling state
0Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 279. The Court observed that the Constitution does not
define "person," and then examines the use of the word in various parts of the Con-
stitution, concluding: " [I]n nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such
that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it
has any possible pre-natal application." See also, Doe v. Israel, 358 F. Supp. 1193
(D. R.I. 1973), voiding a state statute attempting to establish a "conclusive pre-
sumption" that life begins at conception and that at the moment of conception the
fetus is a person with Fourteenth Amendment rights.
10Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 730.
"Id. at 730-31.
2Id. at 731. This analysis of the "personhood" of the fetus has been roundly criti-
cized by a number of commentators. For criticism by a commentator who finds
toe v. Wade "bad constitutional law" without being personally opposed to its re-
sult, see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J.
920, 923-26 (1973).
"Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 733, n. 67. It is difficult to see how the Court would
uphold any statutory provisions requiring consent of a married woman's husband,
or consent of the putative father for an unmarried woman, in view of the Court's
clear holding that the abortion decision is to be made between the woman and her
physician free from state interference in the first trimester, and delineating per-
missible state regulation, only in ways reasonably related to the woman's health, in
the second trimester. In the last trimester, abortion may be totally proscribed except
where necessary to save the woman's life or health, see discussion supra note 28, and
it is equally difficult to see how under those circumstances a husband's or father's
consent could be required without direct violation of a woman's Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process rights.
See Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hospital, 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973), holding that
the putative father is not a necessary party to a woman's and physician's suit at-
tacking a private hospital's regulations prohibiting abortions, and quoting Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion in Roe v. Wade, supra, note 1 at 735. "Several de-
cisions of this Court make clear that freedom of personal choice in matters of mar-
riage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment [citations omitted]. As recently as last term . . . we
recognized 'the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the de-
cision whether to bear or beget a child.' ' RIoe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 735.
See also Jones v. Smith, 278 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1973) holding that a putative father
has no "right" to enjoin a pregnant natural mother from terminating her pregnancy.
In Roe v. Wade, supra note 1, the Court also did not specifically rule on statutes
requiring compulsory psychiatric or other counseling as a prerequisite to abortion, but
the same reasoning would apply to them.
"Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 732-33.
[Vol. 35
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interests allow for state intervention, "the abortion decision in all its
aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic re-
sponsibility for it must rest with the physician. '35 The usual judicial
and "intra-professional" remedies are available against a physician who
abuses this responsibility. 6
The Court noted that in making the abortion decision, the woman
and her physician will necessarily consider physical, psychological, econ-
omic, and sociological factors.3 7 These are the same factors which make
clear the detriment to the woman if the state forbids her this decision.
3 8
A statute not distinguishing between early and late abortions, and allow-
ing abortion only to save the woman's life, "sweeps too broadly, '3 9
denying the woman her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. 40
The Court summarized its holding, clarifying its scope:
A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that
excepts from criminality only a life saving procedure on behalf of
the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recog-
nition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. '
The Court also footnoted twenty state statutes similar to Texas's, in-
cluding Montana's R.C.M. 1947, § 94-401.42
The implications of Roe v. Wade are even more far-reaching when
read with its companion case, Doe v. Bolton,43 invalidating much of
Georgia's recently enacted abortion legislation patterned on the Amer-
ican Law Institute's Model Penal Code.44 In Doe v. Bolton, the Court
affirmed the federal district court's invalidation of certain provisions:
(1) listing permissible reasons for abortions ;45 (2) requiring verification
Rtd. at 733.
mid.
871d. at 727. "Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy
may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical
health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associ-
ated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases,




"Id. The Court did not clarify the Due Process question further. For criticism, see
Ely, supra note 32.
"Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 732.
"Id. at 709.
-93 S. Ct. 739 (1973).
"A.L.I MODEL PENAL CODE, § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
"CODE OF GEORGIA ANNOTATED (1933) (hereinafter cited as GA. CODE ANN.), § 26-1202
(a) allowing exceptions from criminal penalties where: (1) continuation of the
pregnancy endangers the woman's life or would seriously and permanently injure
her health; (2) the fetus will very likely be born with serious, permanent and ir-
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from state officials of probable cause to believe that rape had occurred
where this was given as reason for abortion ;46 and (3) allowing the
solicitor general of the judicial circuit, or a close relative of the fetus,
to seek a declaratory judgment on whether a proposed abortion would
violate any constitutional or other legal rights of the fetus. 47
The Court modified the district court's decision in Doe v. Bolton,
however, by also holding unconstitutional the provisions: (1) requiring
that all abortions be performed in licensed hospitals, and that those
hospitals must be accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Hospitals ;48 (2) requiring that abortions be approved by the hos-
pital's own abortion committee ;49 (3) requiring that two Georgia-licensed
physicians in addition to the woman's own physician physically examine
the woman and concur in her physician's recommendation;50 and (4)
restricting abortions to Georgia residents.5 1
In the aftermath of these decisions, many states' criminal abortion
statutes have been invalidated in whole or part.52 In addition, statutes
prohibiting the dissemination of information about abortion or abortion
services,53 and regulations of public hospitals prohibiting abortion, have
also fallen.
54
MONTANA AFTER ROE v. WADE
The decision on Roe v. Wade came down during the First Session
of the Forty-Third Montana Legislature, when the House had before it
"GA. CODE ANN., § 26-1202(b) (6).
7GA. CODE ANN., § 26-1202(b) (7) (c).
48GA. CODE ANN., § 26-1202(b) (4).
'0GA. CODE ANN., § 26-1202(b) (5).
50GA. CODE ANN., § 26-1202(b) (3).
"GA. CODE ANN., § 26-1202(b) (1).
"Nelson v. Planned Parenthood Center of Tucson, 19 Ariz. App. 142, 505 P.2d 580
(1973); People v. Norton, ...... Colo ....... , 507 P.2d 862 (1973); People v. Frey, 54
Ill.2d 28, 294 N.E.2d 256 (1973); Sasaki v. Commonwealth, 497 S.W.2d 718 (Ky.
1973); State v. Ingel- ......- Md ....... , 308 A.2d 233 (1973); People v. Bricker .....
Mich ....... , 208 N.W.2d 172 (1973) ; State v. Hultgren,, ...... Minn ....... 204
N.W.2d 197 (1973); Spears v. State, ...... Miss _.... , 278 So.2d 443 (1973);
Doe v. Woodahl, 360 F. Supp. 20 (D.Mont. 1973); State v. Strance, 84 N.M. 670,
506 P.2d 1217 (1973); Henrie v. Derryberry, 358 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Okla. 1973);
Commonwealth v. Page, ...... Pa ....... , 303 A.2d 215 (1973) ; Doe v. Israel, 358 F.
Supp. 1193 (D. R.I. 1973); State v. Lawrence . S.C ....... , 198 S.E.2d 253 (1973);
State v. Munson, ...... S.D......., 206 N.W.2d 434 (1973).
In addition, a number of cases were vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court,
for further consideration in light of Roe v. Wade, and other states have enacted new
legislation.
'State v. New Times, Inc.. ...... Ariz ....... , 511 P.2d 196 (Ariz. App. 1973); People v.
Orser . ..... Cal ....... ...... P.2d ...... , 107 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1973). Contra Larkin v.
Cahalan, ...... Mich ....... , 208 N.W.2d 176 (1973). These statutes are similar to R.C.M.
1947, § 94-3609, Advertising to Produce Miscarriage.
"Nyberg v. City of Virginia . F. Supp ......- (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 1973). As to pri-
vate hospitals, see Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hospital, 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973),
holding that a private hospital may refuse to permit abortions contrary to hospital
policy even where the hospital is receiving federal funds under the Hill-Burton Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291z., and is subject to detailed state regulation.
[Vol. 35
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House Bill 463,' 5 an abortion bill substantially in conformity with Roe
v. Wade guidelines.5 6 The decision produced much confusion and anta-
gonism in the legislature, possibly because of misunderstandings of the
decision itself or of the binding effect of a Supreme Court decision, and
also possibly because of moral objections to abortion, or the feeling that
the bill was a political hot potato. The bill was amended in committee,
in several apparently non-conforming ways,57 before it reached the floor
of the House, where it passed.
In the meantime, State Attorney General Robert L. Woodahl issued
an opinion on the status of Montana's criminal abortion statutes in light
of Roe v. Wade.58 He did not mention the Court's "Due Process" sum-
mary,59 or its footnoting of R.C.M. 1947, § 94-401.60 Instead he applied
a general principle of questionable applicability in view of the sum-
mary and footnote: "Montana's criminal abortion statutes are presumed
to be constitutional and in full force and effect until ruled otherwise."6' 1
He said that while Montana's statutes "appear to be similar" to Texas's, 62
Montana, unlike Texas, had provided R.C.M. 1947, § 94-402, forbidding
submission to abortion.65 R.C.M. 1947, § 94-402 presented "a different
legislative purpose and enactment which has not been ruled on by the
United States Supreme Court. '6 4 He did not, however, specify what that
different purpose might be. The opinion implies that the Court found
a right of privacy broad enough to encompass the abortion decision, but
not broad enough to prevent the state from punishing a woman who
acted on the decision.
5Introduced by Harper, Greely, Gunderson, Bradley, Swanberg, Huennekens, Bennetts,
Castles, Turman, Shelden, Jan. 20, 1973.
'GThe bill defined "abortion," provided that abortions be done by licensed medical
practitioners in medical facilities, provided that abortions after the sixth month of
pregnancy could only be done to save the life or health of the woman, required that
records be kept but that names of persons submitting to abortion were to be confi-
dential, repealed R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-401 and 94-402, provided criminal penalties for
violation, and contained both severability and "conscience" clauses.
O'House Bill 463/02. (Note that the 02 represents the first amended version of House
Bill 463.) The significant amendments were: (1) requiring signed consent of the
fetus's father, (2) requiring two consultations with a counselor approved by a Mon-
tana mental health clinic as prerequisite, and (3) leaving §§ 94-401 and 94-402 in
force, subject to the provisions of this bill.
"Roe v. Wade, supra note 1.
5Id. at 732.
"Id. at 709.
"35 Op. ATT'Y. GEN. 9 (1973).
*Id. § 94-401 reads: "Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any
pregnant woman, or procures any such woman to take any medicine, drug, or sub-
stance, or uses or employs any instrument or other means whatever, with intent there-
by to procure the miscarriage of such woman, unless the same is necessary to pre-
serve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less than two
years nor more than five years."
"35 Op. ATT'Y. GEN. 9 (1973). § 94-402 reads: "Every woman who solicits of any per-
son any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, and takes the same, or who submits
to any operation, or to the use of any means whatever, with intent thereby to procure
a miscarriage, unless the same is necessary to preserve her life, is punishable by im-
prisonment in the state prison not less than one nor more than five years."
"35 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 9 (1973). 7
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The Attorney General then recommended his own bill, including:
(1) a policy statement, asserting in particular the compelling state interest
in preserving potential life; (2) repeal of R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-401 and
94-402, with re-enactments of both in language identical to the originals;
(3) provisions substantially within Roe v. Wade guidelines and patently
contradictory to the re-enactments of R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-401 and 94-402;
(4) a severability clause holding valid any parts not specifically ruled
invalid; and (5) a "conscience clause" relieving from participation per-
sons or institutions with moral objections to abortion.6 5
The House passed these recommendations as amendments to 1I.B.
463,66 and the Senate then passed the amended bill with several amend-
ments of its own.67 From the Senate, the bill went into conference com-
mittee, where, with the committee unable to agree, it remained until
adjournment.68 An interim conference committee was appointed to study
the matter in preparation for the next legislative session.6 9
In April, 1973, plaintiff Mary Doe,70 a married woman six to seven
weeks pregnant, filed suit in a Montana federal district court seeking
a declaratory judgment that R.C.M. 1947, 9§ 94-401 and § 94-402 were
unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade. 7 1 She also asked the court to enjoin
defendants Attorney General Woodahl and Missoula County Attorney
Robert L. Deschamps from enforcing the statutes. On May 2, 1973, the
court 72 held R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-401 and 94-402 unconstitutional when
applied to a woman during the first trimester of pregnancy,7 3 and issued
a temporary restraining order to prevent the defendants from enforcing
the statutes against Doe or her physician. 74 On May 29, 1973, under
Roe v. Wade guidelines, the court held Montana's criminal abortion
statutes unconstitutional as a unit.
7 5
Despite fears of many people, Doe v. Woodahl has not turned Mon-
tana into an "abortion mill," 76 although the incidence of legal abortion
651d.
"House Bill 463/03. (Note that 03 represents the second amended version of House
Bill 463.) 0
OSenate Judiciary Committee, REPORT ON HOUSE BILL 463 (1973).
6House-Senate Conference Committee, REPORT ON HOUSE 3ILL 463 (1973).
"Conference Committee members: Senate: George Bennett, R-Helena; Paul Boylan,
D-Bozeman; William MeNamer, R-Billings. House: John Hall, D-Great Falls; Hal
Harper, R-Helena; Joe Roberts, D-Libby.
70' ' ary Doe " I is a pseudonym.
"Roe v. Wade, supra note 1.
72Doe v. Woodahl, supra note 2. The court declined to convene a three-judge court
because " [A]s it would be applied in this case the Montana abortion law is clearly
unconstitutional." Doe v. Woodahl, Civ. No. 2302 (D. Mont. May 2, 1973).
"Doe v. Woodahl, Civ. No. 2302 (D. Mont. May 2, 1973).
74Id.
nDoe v. Woodahl, supra note 2.
"Since Roe v. Wade, supra note 1, applies nationally, and in light of the many states
in which the abortion law has significantly changed in the past few years, supra note
52, this fear was groundless.
[Vol. 35
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in the state is certainly rising.77 Many Montana women still go out of
state for abortions 78 because in-state abortions are generally performed
in hospitals7 9 and are quite expensive.8 0 Apparently only one Montana
hospital, St. Peter's Community Hospital in Helena, has publicly an-
nounced a change of policy to allow abortions in accord with Roe v. Wade
guidelines,8' although others less publicly have loosened their former
restrictions.
Permissible state regulation of abortion under Roe v. Wade is prob-
ably adequately accomplished by existing Montana medical statutes,
hospital regulations, and physician's professional standards.8 2 Thus,
no specific abortion legislation is necessary.83 Even so, it is certain that
the Montana legislature will be under great pressure to enact such legis-
lation in the next session.
8 4
Under Roe v. Wade, the law is clear. In Doe v. Woodahl,85 the court
referred to the Attorney General's abortion opinion, and addressed the
Montana legislature in the following terms:
I have considered whether this Federal Court should abstain from
granting relief beyond that given in the temporary restraining
order and have concluded that in the public interest any doubt
about the invalidity of the Montana abortion law should be removed.
The official position of the State of Montana is that the Montana
laws will be presumed to be constitutional until a court of competent
jurisdiction rules to the contrary. This position shadows the con-
stitutional rights of women as delineated in Roe v. Wade, supra, and
confuses the members of the medical profession who may be called
upon to perform abortions. By this order the Montana Legislature
77Montana hospitals and referral services confirm this, although there are no solid
statistics. Statistics for the pre-Doe v. Woodahl period do not exist, and those since
are largely informal except as they appear in hospital records. There is little indi-
cation of a rise in the absolute numbers of women having abortions. Much of the
in-state rise in legal abortions may be attributed to women now getting legal abor-
tions from physicians in hospitals, whereas before they may have resorted to illegal,
possibly self-induced abortion. Part can also be attributed to women having in-state
abortions where previously they would have gone out of state.
7Primarily to Washington State.
"If any Montana physician is presently performing abortions in a medical office as
allowed under Roe v. Wade, supra note 1, it is apparently a carefully guarded secret.
8GIn Missoula, the hospital fees and physician's fees presently average from $225 to
$250 for a first trimester abortion.
"The Missoulian, Sept. 5, 1973, at 20, col. 1.
"2See Section A, No Specific Abortion Legislation, infra.
"See Section A, No Specific Abortion Legislation, infra.
8To people who regard first and second trimester abortion as primarily a medical
matter, having specific abortion legislation is as absurd as having specific legislation
for any other single medical procedure. The pressure will come, as in the past, from
those who aboslutely oppose abortion on moral grounds, as well as those who, though
not absolutely opposed, fear abuses under existing statutes, regulations, and profes-
sional medical standards. In partial answer to the latter, the Court noted that " [T]he
abortion determination, so far as the physician is concerned, is made in the exercise of
his professional, that is, his 'best clinical' judgment in the light of all the attendant
circumstances." Doe v. Bolton, supra note 43 at 747. ''The State licenses a physi-
cian. If he is derelict or faithless, the procedures available to punish him or to de-
prive him of his license are well known.' Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 761 (Doug-
las, J., concurring).
'Doe v. Woodahl, supra note 2.
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is advised that the interests of the state in the unborn may be
asserted only in a law tailored to conform to the guidelines estab-
lished in Roe v. Wade, supra. 6
LEGISLATION TAILORED TO ROE v. WADE GUIDELINES
Under Roe v. Wade guidelines, there are three basic approaches to
abortion legislation, each of which will be examined in turn. The first
of these is no specific abortion legislation; the second is legislation pre-
cisely tailored to the Court's summary guidelines ;87 and the third is
legislation including the summary guidelines and adding specific pro-
visions designed to be as restrictive as possible without exceeding con-
stitutional limits.
A. No SPECIFIc ABORTION LEGISLATION
At present, abortion in Montana is subject to a number of medical
controls, which, taken together, successfully regulate abortion in close
conformity with Roe v. Wade guidelines. Some of these controls are
strictly "legal," including statutes or agency regulations, or existing
agency powers of regulation which can be drawn upon as needed to
provide regulations specific to abortion. Others are "extra-legal," but
are nonetheless enforceable through the courts or through intra-profes-
sional sanctions. Because of this, there is no need for specific abortion
legislation, legally and practically speaking. Indeed, such legislation
may be, in practical terms, superfluous.
During the first trimester of pregnancy, under Roe v. Wade, abor-
tion must be treated as basically a medical matter .8 It may therefore
be regulated by the state only indirectly, in ways already provided by
the Revised Codes of Montana. First, abortions in Montana must be
performed by licensed physicians. R.C.M. 1947, § 66-1041 provides that
practicing medicine in violation of the Medical Practice Act, 9 including
practicing without a physician's license, is a misdemeanor, and that im-
personating a physician in any way is a felony. Penalties are provided. 90
Second, physicians' standards for general professional responsibility ex-
tend to abortion procedures. R.C.M. 1947, § 66-1037 defines "Unprofes-
sional Conduct," including Subsections (b) "performing abortion contrary
to law," 91 and (q) "any other act, whether hereinabove specifically enum-
erated or not, which, in fact, constitutes unprofessional conduct." R.C.M.
sld.
87Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 732.
RId. at 733.
-R.C.M. 1947, Title 66, Chapter 10.
G°Misdemeanor penalties under R.C.M. 1947, § 66-1401 include either or both a fine
from $250 to $1,000 and imprisonment in the county jail from 90 days to one year.
Further, ''each daily failure to comply with, or each daily violation of, the pro-
visions of this act, shall constitute a separate offense." The felony penalty is im-
prisonment in the state penitentiary from one to ten years at hard labor.
"This Subsection may have limited application if Montana has no criminal abortion
statutes, but would continue to operate on valid regulatory provisions.
[Vol. 35
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1947, § 66-1038 provides punishment for unprofessional conduct, includ-
ing suspension or revocation of a physician's license, or other disciplinary
action as the state board of medical examiners may deem proper. Third,
the state may require physicians to submit medical data on all abortions
performed. The state Department of Health and Environmental Sci-
ences92 has the responsibility, under R.C.M. 1947, § 69-4105, to admin-
ister public health laws, "including but not limited to ... vital statistics,
. . . hospitals and hospital related facilities." R.C.M. 1947, § 69-4106 de-
fines powers, duties and functions of the Department, including the
adoption and enforcement of "rules and standards for carrying out pro-
visions of section 69-4105 and for the preservation of public health
and prevention of disease." These statutes cloarly grant the Department
power to require that physicians submit medical data on all abortions
performed.
During the second trimester of pregnancy, the state may regulate
abortion only in ways reasonably related to the woman's health. 3 All
of the provisions discussed above would apply here. In addition, the
Montana Administrative Code94 provides detailed regulations and stand-
ards for the licensing and maintenance of hospital and medical facilities.
It further sets personnel requirements in such facilities, and requires
that specific patient records be kept and periodically mailed to the De-
partment.
The Department's regulatory powers under R.C.M. 1947, § 69-4105
and § 69-4106 may also be used to restrict the places where late abor-
tions may be performed. Under Roe v. Wade guidelines, the Department
cannot require that first trimester abortions be performed in clinics or
hospitals.9 5 It would, however, have the power to require that later
abortions be done in facilities with adequate equipment, supplies, and
personnel, 96 because the only abortion procedures which are medically
acceptable after the first trimester require facilities beyond those avail-
able in a physician's office. 9
During the third trimester of pregnancy, the state may (but not
must) proscribe any abortions except those necessary to save the life
or health of the pregnant woman.98 During this trimester all of the
statutes and regulatory powers enumerated above would apply. In addi-
0Formerly the State Board of Health, Executive Reorganization Act, R.C.M. 1947, §
82A-601. (Hereafter referred to as the Department).
"Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 732.
9 4Hospital and Medical Facilities 16-2.22(1)-S2200.
5Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 731-32.
9Id.
17There are two procedures suitable for abortions after the first trimester. The "amnio-
infusion" method involves injection of saline or other solution into the uterus, to
begin "labor." The "hysterotomy" method involves an incision in the uterus to
extract the fetus; it is, in effect, an adaption of the Caesarean section. Both pro-
cedures may require hospitalization and equipment for emergency care.
'Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 732.
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tion, hospital policies and regulations, physicians' professional standards,
and women's own great objections, interpose to prevent third trimester
abortion except in circumstances endangering the woman's life or health.
The first restriction is the medical definition of "abortion": de-
struction of the products of conception before the eighth lunar month
of pregnancy (prior to the stage of viability).29 After viability, spon-
taneous abortion is considered premature labor.100 Although this defini-
tion is not legally binding upon a physician's practice, physicians are
very reluctant, for moral or medical reasons, to terminate a third tri-
mester pregnancy for any but the gravest of health reasons.' 10
Since third trimester abortion is a serious medical procedure, a
physician who performed such an abortion without grave reasons would
very likely be subject to disciplinary action through medical organi-
zations, and through intervention of the state board of medical exam-
iners, under their power to punish unprofessional conduct. 10 2
Also, since the powers of the Department of Health and Environ-
mental Sciences may be used to require that abortions after the first
trimester be performed in adequate facilities,"°3 a physician who per-
formed such procedure elsewhere would certainly be subject to dis-
ciplinary action. 0 4 It should be noted, too, that hospital policy in Mon-
tana uniformly prohibits abortions after the stage of viability except
where medically necessary. 0 5 Thus, a physician seeking to perform a
third trimester abortion is accountable not only to his own conscience
and professional standards, but also to the regulatory agencies discussed
above, and to the hospitals or clinics whose facilities he seeks to use.10 6
As to women themselves, available statistics from states with sev-
eral years' experience under liberal abortion laws indicate that women
"Definitions vary only slightly among medical sources. See BLACK'S MEDICAL DIC-
TIONARY (27th ed. 1967) and STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (21st ed. 1966).
'These definitions do not often include intentional termination of pregnancy after via-
•bility,- since most were drafted before states began liberalizing their laws in 1967.
'01Many physicians feel bound by the abortion prohibition in the Hippocratic Oath,
discussed in Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 715-16. See also the Court's discussion
of the role of the American medical profession in the abortion debate, Roe v. Wade,
supra note 1 at 721-22, concluding with the 1970 statement of the House of Dele-
gates of the American Medical Association emphasizing "good medical practice" and
''not mere acquiescence to the patient's demand." Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 722.
a2In Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 722, the Court footnotes an opinion by the A.M.A.
Judicial Council (1970):
In the matter of abortions, as of any other medical procedure, the Judicial Coun.
cil becomes involved whenever there is alleged violation of the Principles of Med-
ical Ethics as established by the House of Delegates.
'"Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 731-32.
'0This might be done by the Department of Health and Environmental Sciences, or by
the board of medical examiners, under their existing regulatory powers. It might also
be done through the A.M.A. or other professional organizations.
1 The Missoulian, supra note 81.
'"OHospitals routinely provide internal mechanisms for dealing with physicians who abuse
the privilege of practicing on the premises. The hospital can refuse to permit proce-
dures which violate its own policies and regulations, and may withdraw the practice
privilege from physicians who abuse it. -
[Vol. 35
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seek first trimester abortion in preference to later abortion, and resort
to later abortion only where first trimester abortion was, for a variety
of reasons, not available.'0 7
At all points in its opinion in Roe v. Wade,0 5 the Court specifically
uses the term "may," not "must," when referring to permissible regu-
lation of abortion. In view of the Court's clear holding that the abortion
decision is inherently and primarily a medical decision to the point in
pregnancy where compelling state interests allow greater regulation, 109
and that the areas of greater regulation either are or can be accom-
plished through existing agencies and channels, there is no need for
specific abortion legislation.
B. LEGISLATION TAILORED TO ROE V. WADE SUMMARY GUIDELINES
This approach may recommend itself to those who wish to clarify
by statute the broad outlines of Montana's abortion law, including the
third trimester prohibition, but who, because of the present powers of
regulation discussed in Section A, above, see no need for further pro-
visions. Such a bill would include:
Section 1. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-401 and 94-402 are repealed. 10
Section 2. (A) Abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy
must be performed by a licensed medical practitioner."'
(B) Abortions from the end of the first trimester until the end
of the second trimester must be performed by a licensed medical practi-
tioner in a licensed hospital or other medical facility.1 2
1
°ONEW YORK CITY HEALTH SERVICES, NEW YORK CITY ABORTION REPORT: THE FIRST
Two YEARS (Oct. 7, 1972). These figures are computed by method of abortion rather
than by stage of pregnancy. They do represent stage of pregnancy, however, since
the suction method and the dilation and curattage (D&O) can be used only during
the first trimester, and the amnio-infusion method and the hysterotomy are used only
after the first trimester. In New York City from July 1, 1970, to June 30, 1972,
there were 402,000 abortions: 261,700 (suction); 84,600 (D&C) ; 53,300 (amnio-
infusion); 2,400 (hysterotomy). Roughly 86% were performed during the first tri-
mester. The percent of first trimester abortions has steadily increased since the early
days under the new law, indicating further that women, once aware of the availability
of abortion, will seek it at the earliest possible moment. Data from other states
supports the above.
Women seeking abortion after the first trimester almost invariably do so for
definite reasons such as the following: (1) medical or legal obstacles delaying what
should have been a first trimester abortion into the second trimester; (2) uncertainty
as to the period of gestation because of menstrual irregularities, lack of other com-
mon physical symptoms of pregnancy, or menopause; (3) sudden abandonment by a
husband or being widowed by his death.
1'Roe v. Wade, supra note 1.
10fId, at 733.
'"These statutes are, of course, still in the Code, though not enforceable because of
Doe v. Woodahl, supra note 2. This provision would remove them.
'Abortions in Montana at present must be performed by a licensed physician, supra
note 89. Use of "licensed medical practitioner" would allow abortions during the
first trimester to be performed by paramedics under a physician's supervision, if the
Medical Practice Act is ever amended to permit that.
'"This provision is wholly unnecessary, since the Department of Health and Environ-
mental Sciences already has the power to require this.
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(C) Abortions may not be performed during the last trimester of
pregnancy unless such abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health
of the pregnant woman. Last trimester abortions must be performed
by a licensed medical practitioner.113
Section 3. Names and identities of persons submitting to abortion
shall remain confidential among medical and medical support personnel
directly involved in the abortion, and among persons working in the
facility where the abortion was performed whose duties include billing
the patient or submitting claims to an insurance company, keeping fa-
cility records, or processing abortion data required by state law." 4
C. PERMISSIBLE RESTRICTivE ABORTION PROVISIONS
These provisions may be added to those in Section B, above, for
legislation as restrictive as Roe v. Wade guidelines will allow:
1. First trimester abortions must be performed by licensed physi-
cians.1 5
2. Abortions after the first trimester of pregnancy must be per-
formed in licensed hospitals."16
3. Abortions after the first trimester of pregnancy must be per-
formed by licensed physicians, and, if the abortion procedure to be used
requires surgery, by licensed physicians with a specialization in sur-
gery.117
4. No person, hospital or clinic shall be required to participate in
an abortion, except when the life or health of the pregnant woman is
endangered by a medical emergency necessitating abortion. No person,
hospital or clinic shall be held liable for such non-emergency refusal,
nor shall the same be subject to any disciplinary or recriminatory action
for such non-emergency refusal." 8
5. Any person who knowingly and purposely violates this act shall
be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or imprisoned
in the state prison not more than five (5) years, or both such fine and
imprisonment." 9
n3Note that "health" includes both physical and psychological health. United States
v. Vuitch, supra note 28.
n'This provision is intended to protect abortion patients' privacy. It may also be un-
necessary, but should probably be included if the state decides to regulate abortion
by criminal statutes.
"'This provision is a total redundancy. See notes 89 and 111, supra.
'See note 26, supra.
n"Id.
"This ''conscience clause" is tempered by the exception for emergency situations, to
provide for the possible but rare sudden medical emergency when refusal to partici-
pate might cost the woman her life or permanently impair her health.
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6. It is the intent of the legislature that if a part of this act is
invalid, all valid parts that are severable from the invalid part remain
in effect. If a part of this act is invalid in one or more of its appli-
cations, the part remains in effect in all valid applications that are
severable from the invalid applications.
120
Several other provisions may suggest themselves to those who wish
restrictive legislation. Anything beyond the provisions outlined above,
however, is of doubtful constitutionality. The general questions of rights
of fathers and husbands, and of requiring counseling as prerequisite to
abortion, are dealt with elsewhere in this paper. 121 Some persons, how-
ever, may wish specifically to restrict the conditions under which minors
may obtain abortions, by requiring written consent from the minor's
parent or guardian if she is unmarried, or written consent from her
husband if she is married.
The constitutionally protected right of individual privacy makes
both of these provisions questionable. 22 In addition, the Declaration of
Rights in the 1972 Montana Constitution specifically recognizes the right
of individual privacy, 23 and the rights of minors.
The rights of persons under 18 years of age shall include, but not
be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article unless specifi-
cally precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such
persons.'
It should be noted that "the protection of such persons" refers to
protection of the minor, not to protection of the unborn.125 In light of
the frequently adverse and well known effects of child bearing and child
rearing upon minors, including a higher incidence of pregnancy and
delivery complications than for women over twenty, psychiatric compli-
cations, possible termination of education, possible "forced" marriage
or the stigma of unwed motherhood, 126 it is difficult to see how requir-
'2Some of the above provisions have not been thoroughly tested under Roe v. Wade,
although in most details they are clearly sound. Even if all had been tested, this
provision would still be wise.
',
2
'See, note 33, supra.
'0Roe v. Wade, supra note 1.
1'MoNT. Cousr. art. II, § 10.
1'
2 MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
'mThe Montana Constitution does not define "person' as including the unborn. Since
the Court in Roe v. Wade, supra note 1 at 729-730 finds that Fourteenth Amendment
protections do not extend to the unborn, it would not be possible for the Montana
Constitution to extend that very protection.
1mCoe and Blum, The Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancy, 40 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 807
(1972). This study incorporates findings from a number of other studies, showing
that the incidence of perinatal deaths, prematurity, maternal physical and psychologi-
cal illness is higher among unwed mothers than among married mothers. The divorce
rate for couples married after the woman became pregnant is also significantly higher
than the divorce rate for couples in which the woman was not pregnant at marriage.
Although these studies focus upon the unwed mother, the average age of the subjects
in each study was under twenty. Menken, The Health and Social Consequences of
Teenage Childbearing, 4:3 Perspectives 45 (1972) directly supports these and other,
similar conclusions. C. Reiterman, Unwanted Children, ABORTION AND THE UNWANTED
CHILD 115 (1971) studies unwanted children in California, noting that from 30 to
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ing such consent would "enhance the protection of such persons." It
may be argued that "protection" is necessary where the pregnant minor
is immature or unstable, but it is even more difficult to see how the
burden of child rearing, or of carrying the pregnancy to term and then
releasing the child for adoption, will enhance maturation or stability.127
CONCLUSION
Although Montana at present is without any specific abortion laws,
128
channels exist for regulation of abortion, as do legal sanctions against
violators. It is certain that the Montana legislature will be faced in
1974 with the question of abortion, and that pressure will be great to
enact specific legislation. Although such legislation is not necessary,
the legislators may wish to act. If so, it is hoped that they will keep
firmly in mind that Roe v. Wade is presently the law of the land, and
that "the interests of the state in the unborn may be asserted only in
a law tailored to conform" to the Roe v. Wade guidelines.12 9 Non-con-
forming legislation can only create more confusion, and fresh litigation.
50% of teenage brides are pregnant at marriage, and that a major cause of school
dropouts in California is premarital pregnancy, "sometimes followed by hasty mar-
riage." Reiterman at 116.
The Court also takes judicial notice of some of these problems, in Roe v. Wade,
supra note 1 at 727.
"'Berkman, Spouseless Motherhood, Psychological Stress and Physical Morbidity, 30
JOURNAL OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 12 (1971). McDonald, Role of Emotional
Factors in Pregnancy, 30 PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE 222 (1968).
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